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The Fourth Circuit Rejects Civil RICO's Investment Use Rule:
Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc.
In 1970 Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO)' in response to the perceived threat of criminal infiltration of
legitimate businesses. 2 In the two decades that have followed, RICO has proved
to be a deadly arrow in the prosecutorial quiver.3 RICO's civil application to
legitimate businesses burgeoned in the 1980s, eclipsing its use as a weapon
against the stereotypical "mobster."' 4 Particularly attractive to plaintiffs is the
relief RICO affords: treble damages and attorney's fees. 5
The growth of civil RICO actions has created a judicial backlash, as some
courts attempt to limit the broad sweep of the statute.6 In the past, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had joined this effort. 7 Busby v.
Crown Supply, Inc.,8 however, marks a dramatic departure from traditional
Fourth Circuit RICO doctrine. In Busby the court rejected the judicially cre-
ated "investment use" rule9 and held that under section 1962(a)10 a RICO plain-
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988)).
2. "The problem, simply stated, is that organized crime is increasingly taking over organiza-
tions in our country, presenting an intolerable increase in deterioration of our Nation's standards.
Efforts to dislodge them so far have been of little avail." 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (remarks of
Sen. McClellan upon introduction of S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., (1969), a precursor to the en-
acted statute).
3. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts--Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1048 & n.204 (1980); Tarlow, RICO
Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 302 n.34 (1983).
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). By the mid-1980s only nine
percent of RICO cases involved "allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with
professional criminals." Id. at 499 n.16 (quoting REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55-56 (1985))
[hereinafter ABA REPORT].
5. "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
6. The most notable attempt at limitation had been the requirement that the plaintiff show a
distinct racketeering injury to recover under § 1962(c), a limitation ultimately rejected by the United
States Supreme Court. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481; see infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Sedima Court's causation requirements for § 1962(c) and the Court's reading of
Congress's intent in enacting the statute. The Court in Sedima also rejected the Second Circuit's
position that a plaintiff could recover only if the defendant had been criminally convicted of the
predicate racketeering acts. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485-86.
Judicial limitations often appear in the interpretations of what constitutes a pattern of racke-
teering. At least one district court has required plaintiff to show that, although a pattern of racke-
teering exists, every predicate act constituting the pattern harmed the plaintiff. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit subsequently repudiated the lower court's position. Mar-
shall & Ilsley Trust v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 131, 166-68 and
accompanying texts.
7. In United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation, the Fourth Circuit held that for actions
filed under § 1962(a), the "person" illegally investing racketeering income must be distinct from the
"enterprise" receiving that income. United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190
(4th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983). The Fourth Circuit was the only circuit to take
this position and has since overruled itself. See infra notes 42-47, 147-59 and accompanying texts.
8. 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
9. The investment use rule is a shorthand way to describe the requirement by some courts that
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tiff is not limited to recovery for harm caused by the investment or use of
racketeering income, but also may recover for harm caused by the racketeering
acts themselves.11
This Note will explore the development of the investment use rule since the
United States Supreme Court handed down its first civil RICO decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 12 Next, the Note analyzes the Busby court's reli-
ance on Sedima, its construction of section 1962(a), and the legislative history
behind RICO. The Note concludes that the Busby court misapplied Sedima and
misread the statute. Although the court exposed corporate racketeers to greater
liability, in doing so it enlarged the class of RICO plaintiffs beyond the statute's
permissible bounds.13
For twenty years John Busby worked as a sales representative for the de-
fendant Crown Supply, Inc. (Crown), 14 receiving a commission based upon the
net profits earned from his sales. 15 At least once a month Crown would give its
commissioned sales force "price books" that purported to show the true costs of
goods to Crown, with adjustments made for overhead and a suggested retail
price for the goods. 16 Busby alleged that certain executives at Crown devised a
scheme to inflate its costs, thereby allowing Crown to reduce commissions based
a § 1962(a) plaintiff allege that defendant's investment or use of racketeering income to acquire,
establish, or operate an enterprise affecting interstate commerce was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's harm. See id. at 836. Mob infiltration of a legitimate enterprise is a paradigm of the rule.
The racketeer who uses racketeering income or threats of violence to acquire an enterprise then uses
the enterprise to launder money or monopolize a market and reap large profits. Under this scenario,
the plaintiff class includes the infiltrated enterprise's original owner and the enterprise's competitors,
suppliers, and customers. See infra notes 178-79. With a self-investing corporate racketeer, an
otherwise legitimate corporation is both the racketeering "person" and the "enterprise" that is ac-
quired or operated with the racketeering income. Then the issue arises whether the defendant corpo-
ration injured the plaintiff solely by its racketeering acts or by the use or investment of the
racketeering income. This Note's primary focus is to explore the various judicial approaches to that
question.
10. Section 1962(a) states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in
which such person has participated as a principal ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
'11. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837.
12. 473 U.S. 479 (1985); see infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
13. The decision once again places the Fourth Circuit's RICO doctrine in a minority position,
disagreeing with the Third and Tenth Circuits. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir.
1989); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 76
(1989). See infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict among the
circuits. Six days after Busby, the Second Circuit also held that the investment or use of the racke-
teering income, not the predicate acts of racketeering, must be the cause of a compensable injury.
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1990).
14. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835. Crown Supply is a wholesale distributor that buys and resells paper
products, cleaning supplies, and equipment to commercial customers exclusively. Brief of Appellees
at 4, Busby (No. 88-2521).
15. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835.
16. Id.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
on falsely shrunken profits.17
Busby also alleged that in 1980 defendant Hammermill acquired Crown 8
and not only perpetuated that scheme, but also developed its own: Hammermill
solicited "rebates" from Crown's suppliers based on the purchase prices Crown
paid for those goods. 19 The rebates went directly to Hammermill, which con-
cealed them from Crown's sales force. This plan further reduced Crown's costs,
yet deprived Busby and the rest of the sales force of commissions based on true
profits.20
Busby filed a RICO action based on sections 1962(a), 2 1 1962(c), 2 2 and
1964(c) 23 and joined with it two pendent state law claims.24 The district court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief on the
ground that plaintiff did not suffer an injury caused by the investment or use of
racketeering income.25 Rather, the court concluded that plaintiff's injuries must
have resulted from the predicate racketeering acts.26
17. Id. The plaintiff alleged that this scheme defrauded nearly 100 other sales representatives
for Crown. Id.
18. Id. Hammermill is a Delaware corporation that has a Commercial Distributors Associates
(CDA) Division comprised of similar wholesale distributors. Brief of Appellees at 4, Busby (No. 88-
2521).
19. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835.
20. Id.
21. See supra note 10 (quoting § 1962(a)).
22. Section 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
23. See supra note 5 (quoting § 1964(c)).
24. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835. The state claims were for fraud and breach of contract. Plaintiff's
Complaint at 28-31, Busby (No. 88-2521).
25. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835-36. The district court did not write an opinion; its decision was
contained in an oral ruling. Id. at 836. The district court considered the alleged acts to form only a
single fraudulent scheme and therefore found that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege a pattern of
racketeering. Id. at 835. The district court also stated that dismissal might be warranted on the
grounds that the complaint alleged Crown and Harnmermill as the defendant "person" and a divi-
sion of Crown and Hammermill as the "enterprise." If true, that relationship would violate the
Fourth Circuit's requirement, set forth in United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation, 689 F.2d
1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983), that for § 1962(a) purposes, the
person and enterprise must be distinct entities. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835. Because the court consid-
ered that a question of fact remained as to the nature of the person/enterprise relationship, it did not
state that Computer Sciences mandated dismissal. Id.
26. Busby, 896 F.2d at 836. The plaintiff alleged the defendants used mail and wire fraud to
conduct their pattern of racketeering. Brief of Appellant at 20, Busby (No. 88-2521). Section
1961(1) lists the predicate racketeering acts as including:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indicta-
ble under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relat-
ing to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating
to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indicta-
ble under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084
(relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction ofjus-
[Vol. 69
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
remanded, finding that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged causation under section
1962(a).2 7 The court acknowledged that "numerous" court, including two
other circuits, require that a plaintiff's injury be caused by the use or investment
of racketeering income.28 Nevertheless, it deemed the investment use rule
"flawed ' 29 in that the rule contradicts not only the causation principles enunci-
ated in Sedima, but also the statutory language and the legislative spirit behind
the statute.30
The Busby court viewed the investment use rule as the type of "amorphous
'racketeering injury' requirement" 3' that the United States Supreme Court had
previously repudiated.3 2 The court also considered the language of section
1964(c) to be critical. Under that section "[a]ny person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962... may sue therefor."'33 A
violation of section 1962(a), 34 the court reasoned, follows from the receipt of
income derived from a pattern of racketeering and the use or investment of the
income in an enterprise.3 5 In cases in which the culpable "person" is a corpora-
tion, not only can the use or investment of racketeering income cause competi-
tive injury to a plaintiff, but the corporate racketeering acts themselves can cause
injury as well. 36 The court found the "by reason of" language sufficiently broad
to allow recovery even though one element of the violation, the use of the in-
tice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating
to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference
with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953
(relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to
unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gam-
bling business), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts),
sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424
(relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations)
or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or
(E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
27. Busby, 896 F.2d at 840. The complaint alleged that " '[t]hrough the use of the fraudulent
schemes... defendant Crown was able to retain funds which rightfully were payable to the plaintiff
Busby and the Class Plaintiffs as commissions based upon the true cost of the goods they sold...
[and] defendant Crown was able to retain those funds and use those funds in its operations as that
term is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).'" Id. The complaint also stated that" 'plaintiff Busby and the
Class Plaintiffs were injured in their business and property by reason of the operation of Crown in
the manner described above."' Id.
28. Id. at 836-37.
29. Id. at 837.
30. Id. at 837-40.
31. Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,495 (1985); see infra notes 83-86 and accompa-
nying text.
32. Busby, 896 F.2d at 839.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
34. See supra note 10 (quoting § 1962(a)).
35. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837.
36. Id. at 838.
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come, did not cause the injury.37
The Fourth Circuit also relied on the congressional mandate to interpret
RICO liberally,38 particularly when construing section 1964(c). 39 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that to effectuate Congress's intent to subject corporate racke-
teers to RICO liability, plaintiffs harmed by a culpable corporation must rely on
section 1962(a) to seek relief: section 1962(c) offers no remedy, as that section
demands that the racketeering "person" be an entity distinct from the racke-
teering-influenced "enterprise." 40 Moreover, since tracing the racketeering in-
come to a plaintiff's injury would prove impossible, the investment use rule
would shield corporations from liability for their predicate acts of
racketeering. 41
Following its analysis and rejection of the investment use rule, the Fourth
Circuit then reconsidered its ruling in United States v. Computer Sciences Corpo-
ration.42 Sitting en banc, the court overruled Computer Sciences and its prog-
eny.43 The court held that under section 1962(a) the "person" and "enterprise"
need not be distinct entities as required under section 1962(c), because section
1962(c) depends on an employer-employee relationship;44 in contrast, section
1962(a) lacks any language implicating an employer-employee relationship.45
By permitting the person/enterprise identification, the Fourth Circuit aban-
doned its minority position46 in favor of one that holds a corporate racketeer
liable while still protecting the infiltrated or victimized enterprise.47
37. Id. The Busby court relied on Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation, 678 F.
Supp. 823, 829 (D. Kan. 1987) and Marshall & lsley Trust Company v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th
Cir. 1987), for this reading of RICO. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837-38. For a discussion of Smith, see
infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text, and for a discussion of Marshall & Jisley, see infra notes
165-68 and accompanying text.
38. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837-38 (citing Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947).
39. Id. "Indeed if Congress' liberal-construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in
§ 1964, where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, 473 U.S,
479, 492 n.10 (1985).
40. Busby, 896 F.2d at 838-39. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the person/enterprise relationship requirements of sections 1962(a) and (c).
41. Busby, 896 F.2d at 839. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the difficulty of tracing racketeering income. For a discussion of a recent Fourth Circuit opinion
that argues that racketeering income is easily traceable, see infra note 203.
42. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
43. The court applied Computer Sciences in Adamson v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 861 F.2d 63,
66 (4th Cir. 1988); Entre Computer Centers, Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d 1279, 1287
(4th Cir. 1987); NCNB Nat'l Bank of North Carolina v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 936 (4th Cir. 1987).
To overrule Computer Sciences, the court adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Haroco
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473
U.S. 606 (1985). Busby, 896 F.2d at 841; see infra text accompanying note 157.
44. See supra note 10 (quoting § 1962(a)).
45. Busby, 896 F.2d at 841.
46. Only three district courts outside the Fourth Circuit have agreed that the person and enter-
prise must be distinct entities under § 1962(a). See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F.
Supp. 908, 916 (D. Minn.), aff'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rey'd on other
grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd on other grounds, 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1985); Cashco Oil Co. v. Moses, 605 F. Supp. 70, 71
(N.D. Ill. 1985). See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Busby dis-
carded the person/enterprise distinction requirement under § 1962(a).
47. Busby, 896 F.2d at 841.
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Putting civil RICO in context requires review of the statutory history and
legislative intent behind its passage.48 In 1967 the congressional push to combat
organized crime with innovative legislation began with the introduction of Sen-
ate Bills 204849 and 2049.50 Senate Bill 2048 created an antitrust statute to
encompass situations in which deliberately unreported income received from one
business was used in another.51 Senate Bill 2049 prohibited entities from invest-
ing income derived from organized crime activities in legitimate businesses. 52
Both bills aimed to deprive organized crime of any competitive advantage over a
legitimate enterprise and to offer remedies to those injured businesses. 53 How-
ever, the Senate took no action on either bill.54
In early 1969 Senator McClellan brought a new bill to the floor: Senate Bill
30, the Organized Crime Control Act.5 5 At that time Senate Bill 30 lacked a
treble damages provision for civil RICO actions, yet the concerns regarding the
infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime remained.5 6 That same
year Senator Hruska introduced Senate Bill 1623, the Criminal Activities Profits
Act, which synthesized the provisions of Senate Bills 2048 and 2049. 57 The bill
prohibited investment of money derived from specified criminal acts into busi-
nesses that affect interstate commerce. 58 It also provided for treble damages.59
The intent behind the bill, however, remained unchanged from earlier bills spon-
sored by Senators McClellan and Hruska.60
Following Senate hearings on Senate Bill 30, Senators McClellan and
48. For a more detailed inquiry into RICO's legislative history, see Blakey, The RICO Civil
Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80
(1982); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1014-21; Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. RaV. 661, 664-85 (1987).
49. S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
50. S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
51. 113 CONG. Rc. 17,999 (1967).
52. Id.
53. Id. Senator Hruska stated:
[Tihe evil to be curbed is the unfair competitive advantage inherent in the large amount of
illicit income available to organized crime.... A full range of criminal and civil sanctions
which now exist in our antitrust laws would be made available to enforcement officials and
to persons adversely affected by such investments.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Blakey, supra note 48, at 254.
55. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Rac. 769 (1969). The cosponsors of the Bill were
Senators Hruska and Ervin. Id.
56. 115 CONG. REc. 5874 (1969). Senator McClellan noted:
When organized crime moves into a business, it usually brings to that venture all the tech-
niques of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal businesses. Competitors can
be effectively eliminated and customers can be effectively confined to sponsored suppliers.
The result is more unwholesome than other monopolies because the newly dominated con-
cern's position does not rest on economic superiority.
Id.
57. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Rac. 6992-93 (1969).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The bill "attacks the economic power of organized crime and its exercise of unfair
competition with honest businessmen on two fronts--criminal and civil." Id. (remarks of Sen.
Hruska).
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Hruska introduced Senate Bill 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act,6 1 which set
forth provisions substantially similar to the RICO statutes ultimately enacted.
Although the bill did not have a treble damages provision, it did seek to
strengthen Senate Bill 1623 through other methods. 62 Like its predecessors,
Senate Bill 1861 intended to give remedies to those injured by unfair means of
competition. 63 Recommendations offered on Senate Bill 1861 were incorporated
into Senate Bill 30,6 and the Senate passed that redrafted bill almost unani-
mously.65 After receiving Senate Bill 30, the House amended it to include treble
damages, and after two days of debate in the full House, the bill passed by a wide
margin.6 6 The Senate agreed to the House version without a conference 67 and
RICO became effective on October 15, 1970.68
Although civil RICO remained dormant for more than a decade, it finally
blossomed across the legal landscape and vigorously took root.69 Section
1962(a) cases typically concern commercial fraud7 0 or securities violations,71
but the political world has not been left untouched.72 The core elements of any
RICO action are a "pattern" 73 of "racketeering activity" 74 that is conducted by
61. S. 1861, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9566-67 (1969).
62. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1018.
63. The drafters of Senate Bill 1861 stated:
The Congress finds.., that the danger of organized crime activities in the nation threatens
the domestic peace, security and stability of its economic system, harms innocent investors
and competing organizations, interferes with free competition, and seriously burdens inter-
state and foreign commerce.... It is, therefore, the declared policy of the Congress to
eradicate the baneful influence of organized crime in the United States... its infiltration of
legitimate organizations, and its interference with interstate and foreign commerce.
S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Congressional Findings and Statement of Policy, 115 CoNG. R c.
9568 (1969).
64. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1018-19.
65. The margin was 73-1. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
66. The House vote was 341-26. Id. at 35,363.
67. Id. at 36,296.
68. Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 1961-68, 84
Stat. 922, 94148.
69. By 1985, of the 270 civil RICO actions to reach a trial court, 40% concerned securities
violations and 37% involved common-law fraud related to commerce. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (1985) (citing ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 55-56).
70. See, eg., Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1148 (10th Cir.) (allegations that
defendant stole natural gas, withheld plaintiff's share of production revenues and billed for nonexis-
tent goods and services), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 666 F.
Supp. 1311, 1312 (D. Minn. 1987) (airline ticket scam); Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Cicero, 629 F. Supp. 1412, 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (insurer claimed bank fraudulently induced it to
issue performance bond for a public contractor).
71. See, eg., Leonard v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express Inc., 687 F. Supp. 177, 178 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (misrepresentations concerning an options trading program); DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton, 662 F.
Supp. 308, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stock churning).
72. See, eg., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1989) (coercive political patronage
practices); Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (journalist's claim that a
Central American right-wing extremist attack caused his injuries).
73. A pattern consists of "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
the effective date of this chapter... and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) (1988).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See supra note 26 for the statutory definition of racketeering
activity.
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a "person" 75 and which affects an "enterprise" 76 engaged in interstate or foreign
cmmerce.77 Additionally, a civil RICO plaintiff must allege that a section 1962
violation caused injury to his business or property.78 Each element, particularly
the pattern element,79 has nurtured a verdant field of doctrinal schism, and none
of the circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, has been able to restrain the ram-
pant disagreements.
In Sedima,8 0 the Supreme Court's first civil RICO decision, the Court set
the standard for analysis of RICO. The decision answered two questions that
had yielded divergent approaches in the lower courts. The first centered on
whether civil RICO requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant had a prior
criminal conviction for the predicate racketeering acts to satisfy language in sec-
tion 1964(c) that the injury be by reason of a "violation." 81 The Court rejected
the prior conviction requirement as inconsistent with the statute's language, his-
tory, and policy.8 2 The second question involved the issue of standing under
section 1962(c). The Second Circuit required a RICO plaintiff to allege a dis-
tinct "racketeering injury," one that is " 'different in kind from that occurring as
a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate
acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter.' ",83 The
Court found itself "hampered by the vagueness of that concept"84 and found
"no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering
injury' requirement."85 Instead, when a plaintiff seeks relief for harm caused by
a defendant conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,
75. A person includes "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest
in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961() (1988).
76. An enterprise includes "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
77. RICO requires only a "minimal" nexus with interstate commerce. R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc.
v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985). For a criminal enterprise, the predicate racketeering
acts themselves may form the nexus with interstate commerce. Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
79. For a discussion of Fourth Circuit pattern doctrine, see infra note 146.
80. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The plaintiff Sedima was a Belgian
corporation that contracted with defendant Imrex to furnish electronic components to another Bel-
gian firm. Id. at 483. Sedima took in the orders and Imrex acquired the parts and shipped them to
Europe. The contract stipulated that the parties would split the profits; however, after Imrex filled
eight million dollars in orders, Sedima accused Imrex of inflating its costs in order to skim off more
profit for itself. Id. at 484. Sedima filed RICO claims under section 1962(c), alleging wire and mail
fraud as the predicate acts. Id. Sedima also joined several pendent state claims, including breach of
contract and unjust enrichment, and alleged damages of at least $175,000. Id.
81. Id. at 485-86. The Second Circuit stood alone in its prior conviction requirement; the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits rejected that position, while the Eighth Circuit announced that civil RICO
liability did not require that the defendant be involved in organized crime. Id. at 486 n.6.
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 485 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
84. Id. at 494.
85. Id. at 495. The Second Circuit's requirement for a distinct racketeering injury derives from
analogizing RICO to the Clayton Act. Id. at 485. The Clayton Act provides that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor ... and shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988). The Clayton Act provision that
affords treble damages served as a model for RICO's § 1964(c). Sedima, 473 U.S. at 485. The
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"the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts suffi-
ciently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the com-
mission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise."'86
In his dissent, Justice Marshall reviewed RICO's legislative history and
concluded that RICO's treble damages provision received only "cursory atten-
tion" and was added almost as an "afterthought." 87 More clear to Justice Mar-
shall was the congressional intent to afford a remedy to types of injuries not
adequately compensated under existing antitrust laws: injury that is similar to,
"but broader than, that targeted by the antitrust laws and different in kind from
that resulting from the underlying predicate acts."8 8  Competitors can suffer
these injuries by being forced out of business through threats or acts of vio-
lence,8 9 as can investors by being displaced by a racketeer who infiltrates and
gains control of a business through a pattern of racketeering.90 In either case,
RICO's civil provision would bar the direct victim of the predicate acts from
seeking relief; the statute reserves that remedy for the indirect victims of the
predicate acts.9 ' The Sedima majority rejected an interpretation of section
1962(c) that limited damages solely to competitive injuries92 and dismissed Jus-
tice Marshall's construction as a "topsy turvy" approach.93 The Court found
that Congress "wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enter-
prises.... The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity
nor immunity from its consequences."'94
The Sedima opinion has cast a long shadow across RICO jurisprudence,
and courts addressing the investment use rule have struggled with Sedima's lan-
guage. Courts that reject the investment use rule find support in Sedima 95 as do
Second Circuit concluded that because a Clayton Act plaintiff must allege an antitrust injury, a
RICO plaintiff must allege a racketeering injury. Id. at 485.
86. Id. at 497. It should be emphasized that although the Court in Sedima was addressing a
violation of § 1962(c), many courts, including the Busby panel, consider this discussion to be more
generic and, therefore, applicable to § 1962(a) inquiries. Busby, 896 F.2d at 839. Some commenta-
tors view the investment use rule, when combined with the requirement that the person and enter-
prise be distinct entities under § 1962(c), as an attempt to reverse Sedima. Blakey & Cessar,
Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheirm
Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 586
n.237 (1987).
87. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 511 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the legislative intent regarding the types of conduct Congress sought to deter and the
type of injuries it sought to compensate.
89. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 522 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 521-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The construction I describe offers a powerful rem-
edy to the honest businessmen with whom Congress was concerned, who might have had no re-
course against a 'racketeer' prior to enactment of the statute." Id. at 523 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 497.
93. Id. at 497 n.15.
94. Id. at 499.
95. See Busby, 896 F.2d at 839-40; In re National Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cer-
tificates Sec. Lit., 682 F. Supp. 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Smith v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 823, 829 (D. Kan. 1987); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 321
(M.D. Pa. 1986).
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courts that embrace the rule.96 Before Sedima the few courts that addressed the
causation requirements of section 1962(a) gave it cursory attention;97 only since
Sedima have courts fully analyzed and debated the investment use rule.
98
The post-Sedima battle lines began to form in Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc.99 In Gilbert the class-action plaintiff was a securities investor
who bought stock through the defendant brokerage house.1 ° The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant conducted a scheme to induce the purchase of worth-
less stocks by misrepresenting the viability of the issuing corporations and inflat-
ing the value of the stocks. 10 1 The trial court held that plaintiff lacked standing
under section 1962(a) because the predicate acts of racketeering, and not the
investment or use of the racketeering proceeds, harmed her. 10 2 Although, after
Sedima, injury caused by the predicate acts would be sufficient to state a claim
under section 1962(c), plaintiff could not make use of that statute because de-
fendant was not a person distinct from the enterprise.103 Plaintiff argued that if
courts denied standing to parties like herself, there could be no civil liability for
a violation of section 1962(a). 104 The court did not agree and declared that
"using the proceeds of racketeering activities to infiltrate legitimate businesses
can obviously cause damage to many persons, who would have a perfect right to
sue. It just happens that plaintiff is not among them .... ,,o5
In rapid succession courts began to map the various contours of this latest
RICO battlefield. In DeMuro v. E.F. Hutton, 106 plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued
that the racketeering proceeds realized by defendant brokerage house financed
defendant's operating expenses, which permitted defendant to continue to de-
fraud plaintiffs.10 7 The court thought such a theory would "turn every churning
96. See Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1990); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas
Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.
v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 84 (S.D. Ohio 1986); NL Indus. v. Gulf & W., Inc., 650 F.
Supp. 1115, 1128 (D. Kan. 1986).
97. See Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 720-21 (D.D.C. 1983). Guerrero required that
the plaintiff's injury be caused by the investment of racketeering proceeds, a requirement it labelled a
"racketeering injury." Guerrero's analysis also applied to a claim under § 1962(c). Id. at 722. The
Sedima decision necessarily voids that part of the opinion.
98. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at 585 n.237; Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F.
Supp. 1407, 1408-11 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Louisiana Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F.
Supp. 781, 805-07 (E.D. La. 1986).
99. 643 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
100. Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d 940, 941 (3d Cir. 1985).
101. Id.
102. Gilbert, 643 F. Supp. at 111. The Third Circuit had reversed the trial court's requirement
that the plaintiff must allege a distinct racketeering injury under § 1962(c). Gilbert v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 769 F.2d at 942. On remand, the trial court addressed the issue of whether the
complaint also stated a claim under § 1962(a). Gilbert, 643 F. Supp. at 108-09. Although the Gilbert
court did not explicitly state how the defendants allegedly invested the racketeering income, another
court subsequently inferred that the defendants invested the proceeds in stock of other companies
and not in their own brokerage house. See Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Pa.
1988).
103. Gilbert, 643 F. Supp. at 109.
104. Id. at 111.
105. Id. It should be noted that the trial court that ruled against the plaintiff Busby adopted the
reasoning outlined in Gilbert. Busby, 896 F.2d at 835-36.
106. 662 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
107. Id.
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case into a RICO case" and "would involve a vast and unwarranted extension of
the boundaries of civil RICO." 10 8 Other courts were more amenable to this
"self-investment" theory and applied it in dissimilar circumstances: securities
churning cases, 109 insurance fraud suits,' 10 and construction contract fraud
claims."' In each context, the racketeering income was used to operate the
culpable enterprise. 112 Not all of the courts that considered the self-investment
theory explicitly analyzed the issue based on the language of section 1962(a). 113
That statute forbids the use or investment of racketeering income to acquire,
establish, or operate an enterprise that affects interstate commerce. 1 14
Other courts found additional reasons for hostile treatment of the invest-
ment use rule: the insurmountable hurdles the rule puts in the path of a RICO
plaintiff. In Louisiana Power & Light Company v. United Gas Pipe Line Com-
pany,11 5 a local utility sued its gas supplier for breaching a partial requirements
contract, inflating the cost of gas, and failing to credit the utility for certain
108. Id. at 308-09; see also Vereins-Und Westbank AG v. Carter, 639 F. Supp. 620, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that DeMuro controls).
109. Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 320-321 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 862 F.2d
310 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub. no=. In re Elwell, 862 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1988). Another court adopting the
"self-investment" theory inferred that the Roche court reached its conclusion by distinguishing itself
from Gilbert: whereas the Gilbert defendant invested the proceeds in an unrelated business that did
not injure plaintiff, the defendant in Roche invested its racketeering income in a business connected
with the racketeering activity. Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
110. Blue Cross, 680 F. Supp. at 198-99. In this case, the defendant operated a pharmacy and
contracted with Blue Cross to provide prescriptions for Blue Cross subscribers. In return, Blue
Cross paid the pharmacy. Blue Cross alleged that the defendant began submitting claims for pre-
scriptions that were not filled or prescribed. Blue Cross alleged mail fraud as the predicate act and
claimed that the defendant kept some of the income for himself and invested the rest in the phar-
macy. Id. at 196-97. The defendant argued that his filing false claims, and not the investment of the
racketeering income, injured Blue Cross. Id. at 197. The court disagreed and found that investing in
the pharmacy permitted the defendant to maintain its operation and perpetuate the fraud. Id. at
198-99.
111. Omega Constr. Co. v. Altman, 667 F. Supp. 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 1987). The plaintiff
construction company contracted with defendant Altman to build apartments in Florida and Michi-
gan. Altman was the sole shareholder of a development company (ADC). Altman and ADC organ-
ized four limited partnerships to build the apartments and all six entities were joined as defendants.
Id. at 456. Omega claimed the defendants defrauded Omega by contracting for the construction
with no intention to fulfill its promises. Id. Omega alleged the partnerships were used to issue
fraudulent mailings. Id. at 464. The court found that even though the complaint alleged that the
limited partnerships received racketeering income and used it in their operations, the complaint did
not show how this investment caused a § 1962(a) injury. Id. at 464-65. The court agreed, however,
that the complaint alleged that Altman and ADC used the racketeering income to establish or oper-
ate ADC and the limited partnerships in a way that caused injury to Omega. Id. at 465.
112. Cf. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249, 1256, opinion upon reconsider-
ation, 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988). In Snider the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants defrauded him on the sale of art plates and screens. Id. at 1250.
The court distinguished DeMuro's repudiation of the self-investment theory on the ground that
DeMuro involved a legitimate business--a brokerage house. The Snider court found that the defend-
ant's enterprise existed solely for the purpose of committing fraud. Investment of racketeering in-
come in an otherwise legitimate enterprise could be used to further the legitimate activities of the
business, raising the possibility that the investment might not have caused the plaintiff's injury. Id.
at 1256. If the enterprise's sole function is to commit fraud, "investment in the enterprise.., is
inseparable from the fraud." Id.
113. But see Blue Cross, 680 F. Supp. at 198; Omega Constr., 667 F. Supp. at 463-65.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
115. 642 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1986).
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refunds.116 Finding support in dictum from a case not directly addressing the
investment use rule,117 Louisiana Power announced that a plaintiff satisfies
RICO's causation requirements if a plaintiff suffers harm from defendant's rack-
eteering acts and if defendant uses the racketeering proceeds in its business. 118
Unlike other self-investment holdings,11 9 Louisiana Power did not require any
causal connection between the self-investment and plaintiff's injuries. 120 The
court was concerned that because of section 1962(c)'s person/enterprise distinc-
tion requirement, the only recourse for a plaintiff injured by corporate racketeer-
ing is section 1962(a). 12 1 However, an investment or use causation requirement
would shield the corporate racketeer: the racketeering proceeds would be in
cash, and they would be impossible to trace once the corporation invested in
itself.122 The court observed that because the cash is untraceable, "no causal
connection between the use or investment of ill gotten cash and an injury to the
plaintiff is provable." 123 To require a plaintiff to trace the proceeds and show an
additional causal connection would be "inequitable"-the plaintiff "would not
stand a chance of proving its case." 124
116. Id. at 786.
117. The case relied on was B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 617 F. Supp. 49, 52
(D.C.N.J. 1985). Hirsch involved a jewelry manufacturer alleging breach of contract and fraudulent
misrepresentation against a metal refiner. Id. at 49. As Louisiana Power recognized, Hirsch does not
overtly stand for the proposition that § 1964(c)'s "by reason of" clause does not require the plaintiff
"prove some injury flowing to it from the use or investment of racketeering proceeds in addition to
the damage caused by the predicate acts." Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 806 (emphasis added).
According to the court in Hirsch, the defendant "inevitably used or invested, directly or indirectly,
all or part of the income received from a pattern of racketeering activity in the operation of its own
business [and] plaintiff has the requisite standing.... That is, plaintiff has suffered a racketeering
injury by reason of Enright's violation of section 1962(a)." Hirsch, 617 F. Supp. at 52. Louisiana
Power considered this cryptic holding to implicitly support a finding of liability based on an injury
from the predicate racketeering acts if the defendant subsequently invested or used the income de-
rived from the racketeering. Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 806. To require the use or investment
be the proximate cause would "impose an additional causal element." Id.
118. Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 805-07.
119. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
120. Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 806-07. In reaching this conclusion the Louisiana Power
court also examined Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
The court interpreted Gilbert to require plaintiff to be injured first by the racketeering activity and
then receive "some additional injury" caused by the use or investment of the racketeering income.
Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 805 n.21 (emphasis added). A review of Gilbert, however, reveals
no such double injury "requirement." Indeed, for a court to insist upon a double injury requirement
it would have to ignore the class of plaintiffs already permitted to recover under RICO: those who
suffer a competitive injury after a racketeer monopolizes a market through a pattern of racketeering.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 521 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes
87-91 and accompanying text; see also Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at 586 n.237 ("Little doubt
exists ... that direct investment or competitive injury is within the statute."). It follows that if a
competitor may recover even though the pattern of racketeering did not harm the competitor, the
double injury "requirement" is a mere fiction. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text, how-
ever, for a discussion of a double injury requirement and how it could provide a reasonable ground
for a compromise solution in the case of plaintiffs initially injured by the racketeering acts.
121. Louisiana Power, 642 F. Supp. at 806.
122. Id. "Corporate defendants simply do not keep such records, for the good reason that it is
unnecessary to worry about where each dollar in a company goes." Id.
123. Id. at 806-07.
124. Id. at 807. For a discussion of how the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have addressed the
difficulty of tracing racketeering income in the criminal RICO setting, see infra note 203 and accom-
panying text.
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Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation1 25 raised other objections to
the investment use rule: if courts limit compensable injury to that suffered by
the investment or use of racketeering income, then only the competitors of the
corporate racketeer would have standing.1 26 This result is problematic because
competitors likely will not be aware of racketeering acts committed against third
parties. 127 The Smith court also relied on Sedima for support: "'[i]f the defend-
ant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these
provisions [section 1962(a)-(c)], and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff
in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c).' "128
Although the Smith court acknowledged that Sedima involved a claim
under section 1962(c), it considered the Court's language broad enough to sug-
gest that a section 1962(a) plaintiff need only allege injury from the predicate
racketeering acts. 129 Finally, the Smith court concluded that the language of
the statutes does not impose a requirement of an injury caused by the defend-
ant's use of the racketeering income. 130 Although section 1964(c) requires an
injury by reason of a section 1962 violation, "[a] plaintiff injured by the predi-
cate acts is injured as a result of the violation in spite of the fact that one element
of the violation, the use of the proceeds, did not contribute to or cause his
injury."131
While the investment use rule percolated among the district courts for sev-
eral years, an appeals court did not address the issue until the Tenth Circuit
adopted the rule in Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corporation132 Of primary signifi-
cance to the Grider court was the plain language of section 1962(a): the statute
125. 678 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1987). Factually, Smith is very similar to Busby: Smith brought
a class action suit against her employer claiming that MCI had fraudulently deprived her and other
salespersons of commissions due them. Id. at 825.
126. Id. at 829.
127. Id.; see also King v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 86-0211, slip op. at 9-10 n.6 (D.D.C Mar. 13,
1987) (unpublished opinion available on WESTLAW, DCTU database) (suggesting that in addition
to competitors, stockholders in the racketeering corporation may also have standing under
§ 1962(a), but would be equally unaware that the corporation had committed the predicate racke-
teering acts).
128. Smith, 678 F. Supp. at 829 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495
(1985) (emphasis in Smith)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. The Smith court found support for this proposition in Marshall & Ilsley Trust Com-
pany v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987). However, Marshall & lsley is inapplicable to a
discussion of § 1962(a)'s causation requirements because the court's inquiry focused on the racke-
teering pattern. The Seventh Circuit held that a RICO plaintiff must prove there were predicate acts
sufficient to form a pattern, but the plaintiff need not prove that "every act involved in the pattern
also caused a direct injury to the plaintiff." Marshall & llsley, 819 F.2d at 809-10 (footnote omitted),
For a discussion of this misplaced reliance on Marshall & lsley, see infra notes 161-70 and accompa-
nying text.
132. 868 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989). Grider was a working
interest holder in a group of oil and gas wells who claimed that the defendant well operators de-
frauded him by stealing natural gas from the well, selling gas without paying him, withholding
discounts and rebates owed him, and billing him for nonexistent goods and services. Id. at 1148.
Grider alleged the predicate acts involved mail fraud. Id. at 1148-49. Given the Tenth Circuit's
adoption of the investment use rule, Grider effectively overrules Smith v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 678 F. Supp 823 (D. Kan. 1987). Although Busby relied upon Smith, the latter decision now
lacks any precedential force.
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does not prohibit the receipt of racketeering income, but it does prohibit "a per-
son who has received the income from using or investing it hi the proscribed
manner." 133 The Grider court also rejected the contention that Sedima grants
standing to a section 1962(a) plaintiff injured only from the racketeering acts,
finding that sections 1962(a) and (c) differ "significantly."' 134 Because section
1962(c) prohibits conducting an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity,"' 135 the statute prohibits the predicate acts themselves. 136
Grider repeated Sedima's warning that" 'the plaintiff only has standing if. .. he
has been injured ... by the conduct constituting the violation.' "137 The Grider
panel also dismissed any policy arguments based upon the mandate that RICO
be construed liberally or that the investment use rule shields corporate racke-
teers and found that a liberal interpretation of RICO is unjustified if it expands
the statute beyond the limits of its language. 138 Instead, if the statute proves
inadequate to" 'cover all methods of corporate wrongdoing, it is up to Congress,
and not the courts, to expand the scope of the statute.' 139
Within a year of Grider, the appellate courts rapidly joined the fray as four
more circuits staked out their positions on section 1962(a). In Rose v. Bartle 140
the Third Circuit adopted the investment use rule, albeit with minimal analysis.
The court found the rule consistent with the plain language of the statute14 1 and
deferred to the weight of authority supporting the rule.14 2 A year later the
Fourth Circuit chose to split with the Third and Tenth Circuits; however, within
a week of Busby, the Second Circuit adopted the reasoning the Tenth Circuit
outlined in Grider.143 The most recent Court of Appeals to address the issue,
133. Grider, 868 F.2d at 1149; see infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text; see also Palumbo v.
I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (N.D. IlM. 1988) (the use and investment constitutes the
violation while the remaining language describes the circumstances under which the violation
occurs).
134. Grider, 868 F.2d at 1150.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988); see supra note 22 (quoting § 1962(c)).
136. Grider, 868 F.2d at 1150.
137. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,'496 (1985)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986)). But
see Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 693 F. Supp. 666, 672 (N.D. Ill.
1988) ("It is for Congress, not the courts, to narrow down what may be viewed as an excessively
broad statute."), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989).
140. 871 F.2d 331, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 358.
142. Id. at 357. Given the holding in Rose, one influential case opposing the investment use rule
now lacks any precedential force: B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 617 F. Supp. 49 (D.N.J.
1985) (relied on by Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781,
807 (E.D. La. 1986)).
143. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990). The defendants in Ouaknine
solicited plaintiff to invest in shares of a corporation set up to renovate and sell cooperative apart-
ments in New York City. Id. at 78. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants made misrepresenta-
tions to induce his agreement to accept a nonrecourse note in lieu of cash from the sale of the
corporation. Id. at 78-79. The complaint alleged securities violations and breach of contract. Id. at
77. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's § 1962(a) claim after rejecting plaintiff's
argument that Sedima permits recovery under § 1962(a) for injury caused only by the predicate
racketeering acts. Id. at 83. The court acknowledged that RICO should be liberally interpreted, but
the court refused to "permit abrogation of the explicit words of the statute." Id.
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the Sixth Circuit, joined the majority in support of the investment use rule. 144
Aside from being the only decision issued by a federal appellate court that
repudiates the investment use rule, Busby is significant in the breadth of its hold-
ing. Like other courts that disfavor the rule, 145 the Busby court completely
sweeps aside the need for any causal connection between the use or investment
of the racketeering proceeds and the plaintiff's injuries. Additionally, the Busby
decision apparently marks a turning point for Fourth Circuit RICO doctrine:
previously RICO plaintiffs typically received a chilly reception in the Fourth
Circuit, 146 but Busby significantly expands the class of RICO plaintiffs and in
turn broadens the scope of liability under section 1962(a).
For the Busby court to find in favor of plaintiff, the court first had to aban-
don its holding in United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation14 7 That case
involved claims by the government that defendant (CSC) had defrauded the gov-
ernment by overbilling for computer services. 148 The entity alleged to be the
enterprise was in fact a division of defendant and had no corporate existence
144. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 494 (6th Cir. 1990). Craighead involved
investors suing a securities broker, alleging fraud and stock churning. Id. at 487-89. Citing to
Grider, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under § 1962(a). The court stated
that § 1962(a) requires "a separate and traceable injury, and plaintiffs have alleged only injuries
traceable to the alleged predicate acts." Id. at 494.
145. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781, 807 (E.D.
La. 1986) ("ITmhe plaintiff need only show that it was damaged by the racketeering activity of the
defendant .... No additional injury or causal connection to the defendant's violation of § 1962(a)
need be shown.").
146. The person/enterprise distinction requirement under § 1962(a), as formulated by United
States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983),
is but one example of the hostile treatment the Fourth Circuit has given to civil RICO. See infra
notes 147-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Computer Sciences. The Fourth Circuit's
approach to the pattern requirement is also illustrative of this attitude. Originally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in International Data Bank; Ltd. v. Zepkin, rejected adopting a mechanical test for pattern and
announced that pattern requires a "threat of continuing activity." Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149, 154 (4th
Cir. 1987). The Zepkin court stated that "[wihat constitutes a RICO pattern is thus a matter of
criminal dimension and degree." Id. at 155. The court thus held that a "single, limited scheme"
could not create a pattern; to hold otherwise would frustrate RICO's purpose to protect against
"ongoing unlawful activities whose scope and persistence pose a special threat to social well-being."
Id. Instead, a large, continuous scheme could create a pattern of racketeering. Id. at 154-55. This
position was a reasonable extension of the pattern requirement hinted at in Sedima, and stood in
contrast to the Eighth Circuit's more restrictive formula requiring that plaintiffs show that the predi-
cate acts occurred in multiple criminal schemes. Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d
326, 329 (8th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court eventually rejected the Eighth Circuit's multiple crim-
inal schemes requirement. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899 (1989). In
pattern discussions following Zepkin, however, the Fourth Circuit's pattern requirement grew ever
more restrictive, focusing on the defendant's purported ends rather than the means to accomplish
those ends. See Walk v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 847 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1988) (defendant rail-
road's Alleged commission of predicate acts over a ten-year period did not create a pattern of racke-
teering; the ultimate goal of removing outside minority interests in the corporation did not pose a
special threat to social well-being), vacated and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 3235, rev'd, 890 F.2d 688
(1989); Eastern Publishing & Advertising, Inc. v. Chesapeake Publishing & Advertising, Inc., 831
F.2d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1987) (although the predicate acts were sufficient in number and sufficiently
related, defendant publisher's alleged copyright infringement was merely a nonrecurring scheme to
gain a competitive advantage and posed no threat of continued activity in the future), vacated and
remanded, 109 S. Ct. 3234 (1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 971 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3274 (1990).
The Fourth Circuit's increasing hostility to RICO plaintiffs stood unchallenged until the Supreme
Court vacated Walk and Eastern Publishing in light of its decision in Northwestern Bell.
147. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
148. Id. at 1183.
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apart from CSC.149 The court failed to distinguish between sections 1962(a) and
(c) and blithely concluded "that 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being differ-
ent from, not the same as or part of, the person whose behavior the act was
designed to prohibit, and, failing that, to punish." 150 As a result, the Computer
Sciences court dismissed the government's claim that CSC violated section
1962(a) by investing or using racketeering income in the operation of CSC's
subdivision.151 Fourth Circuit decisions subsequent to Computer Sciences fol-
lowed the requirement that the person and enterprise be distinct entities without
questioning its applicability to section 1962(a). 152 Although the person/enter-
prise distinction requirement enjoys widespread support as applied to section
1962(c), 153 only a few district courts outside the Fourth Circuit read the same
requirement into section 1962(a). 154 The justification for requiring the distinc-
tion is threefold: Judicial hostility to the idea that the defendant could partici-
pate with itself in investing racketeering income; fulfillment of RICO's purpose
of giving relief for a racketeer's infiltration of a legitimate business yet protecting
the infiltrated enterprise; and the support of ongoing congressional efforts to
curb the scope of RICO. 155
Despite this line of decisions supporting the application of the person/en-
terprise distinction in actions under section 1962(a), the Fourth Circuit finally
bowed to the logic of Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Com-
pany.156 In Haroco, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that:
Subsection (a) does not contain any of the language in subsection (c)
which suggests that the liable person and the enterprise must be sepa-
rate. Under subsection (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corpo-
ration using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its
operations. This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the corpora-
tion-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the
direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but
not when it is merely the victim, prize, or passive instrument of
racketeering. 157
The Busby court found this argument "compelling" because section
1962(c) requires a relationship between the person and enterprise, while section
149. Id. at 1190.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1190-91.
152. See supra note 43.
153. Busby, 896 F.2d at 840.
154. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 916 (D. Minn.), aff'd on
other grounds, 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989);
Cashco Oil Co. v. Moses, 605 F. Supp.70, 71 (N.D. Il. 1985); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Supreme Court has declined to express an opinion on
whether § 1962(a) requires the person/enterprise distinction. Northwestern Bell, 109 S. Ct. at 2898
n.l.
155. Northwestern Bell, 653 F. Supp. at 916; see also Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1197 ("[I]f it is
inappropriate to plead identity in 1962(c), it is then inappropriate to plead it under section 1962(a),
particularly in light of our knowledge that the statute was not intended to convict the infiltrated
enterprise but the violator of the predicate acts.").
156. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
157. Id. at 402.
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1962(a) only prohibits a person from using an enterprise.158 The decision to
abandon the distinction requirement for section 1962(a) makes sense. Otherwise
a corporate racketeer investing its racketeering income in another enterprise
would be liable, yet the same corporation would go unpunished if it invested the
proceeds in its own operations.159
Although the Busby court should be commended for disavowing Computer
Science's distinction requirement, its repudiation of the investment use rule suf-
fers from numerous faults, beginning with its construction of the statute. The
statute neither prohibits a pattern of racketeering nor the receipt of racketeering
income. Rather, the statute provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful... to use or
invest... any part of such income" to acquire, establish, or operate an enter-
prise.1 60 The use or the investment of the racketeering income violates the plain
language of the statute. To suggest otherwise is disingenuous. The Fourth Cir-
cuit's construction conflicts with interpretations by the Supreme Court1 6 1 and
commentators. 162 Significantly, the Busby court ignores other language within
section 1962(a) that exempts certain investments from prohibition. 163  Using
racketeering income for securities investments does not violate section 1962(a) if
those investments do not amount to a minimum percentage of ownership in the
infiltrated enterprise and the investor does not have the power to elect the enter-
prise's directors. Critics of the investment use rule have failed to explain why, if
Congress intended to grant standing to victims of predicate acts, it chose to limit
the class of plaintiffs based upon the scope of the investment-based infiltration.
Why should a racketeering victim be denied standing merely because the racket-
eer did not "properly" invest the ill-gotten funds? The most logical answer is
that Congress intended to grant relief to those injured by the use or investment
of racketeering income and not those victimized by the predicate acts.
164
158. Busby, 896 F.2d at 841.
159. Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 678 F. Supp. 823, 828 (D. Kan. 1987).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988); see supra note 10 (quoting § 1962(a)).
161. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2897 (1989) ("RICO renders
criminally and civilly liable 'any person' who uses or invests income derived 'from a pattern of
racketeering activity' to acquire an interest in or to operate an enterprise engaged in interstate com-
merce... ."); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L., v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,495 (1985) (§ 1962(a) "makes it
unlawful... to use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an enterprise,"
(emphasis added)).
162. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1021 ("RICO makes unlawful.., using income
derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise .... "); Gold-
smith, Civil RICO Reform.; The Basis for Compromise, 71 MINN. L. REV. 827, 830 (1987) ("RICO
prohibits ... the investment of racketeering proceeds ...."); Lynch, supra note 48, at 701 ("Sec-
tion[ ] 1962(a)... prohibit[s] a single action ... the investment of a sum of money. . . ."). But see
Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at 585 n.237 (rejecting investment use rule).
163. Section 1962(a) provides in part:
A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the
intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer.., shall not be unlaw-
ful . . . if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser ... do not amount in the
aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer
... the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
164. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S 976, S.
1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1969) [hereinafter Senate
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In response to the argument that the plain language of section 1962(a) de-
mands application of the investment use rule, the Busby court labeled the use or
investment of racketeering income as merely "one element of the violation." 165
The court then pointed out that a plaintiff may recover if it proves a section 1962
violation and "'an injury directly resulting from some or all of the activities
comprising the violation' "; therefore, failure to prove an element of a RICO
action is not fatal. 166 The court misplaced its reliance on the quoted material:
"the violation" referred to in Marshall & Ilsley Trust Company v. Pate is the
pattern of racketeering.1 67 The court in Marshall & Ilsley Trust merely held that
once a plaintiff proves that a pattern of racketeering exists, there is no need to
prove the plaintiff was harmed by every predicate act that forms the pattern. 168
By confusing the multiple acts that form a pattern with the circumstances sur-
rounding the use of racketeering income, 169 the Busby court evades the grava-
men of the offense, for the use or investment is the violation. 170
Hearings]. Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst recommended to the Senate subcommittee that
Senate Bill 1861 be amended to exempt de minimis securities investments. Id. Mr. Kleindienst
stated that "subsection (a)'s total ban on the acquisition of any interest in an enterprise, including
the purchase of even a single share of stock, is unnecessary and beyond the scope of the evil at which
the legislation is aimed." Id. Section 1962(a) incorporates nearly verbatim the language Mr. Klein-
dienst suggested.
165. Busby, 896 F.2d at 838.
166. Id. (quoting Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987) (empha-
sis in Busby)).
167. See supra note 131.
168. Marshall & lsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit
was addressing a § 1962(c) claim, and, as Sedima demonstrated, conducting an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering is the violation.
169. See Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp.1407, 1410 n.5 (N.D. 111. 1988); 116 CONG.
REc. 18,940 (1970) (Senator McClellan remarking that committing the predicate acts that form the
pattern is insufficient to hold the racketeer liable).
170. Critics of the investment use rule argue that the rule's proponents assume that "the victim
of the 'racketeering activity' is not separately injured by the investment (or use) of the income (or its
proceeds)." Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at 586 n.237 (emphasis in the original). Blakey and
Cessar note that money acquired by fraud has been converted; they also state that "[a]ny distinct act
of dominion over the property is, however, a separate conversion." Id. (emphasis in the original).
Blakey and Cessar find support for this notion in Gowin v. Heider, 237 Or. 266, 272, 391 P.2d 630,
636 (1964). Their reliance on Gowin is misplaced. In Gowin, evidence showed that the defendant's
agent took possession of the plaintiff's truck after the defendant coerced the plaintiff into signing a
letter releasing the truck to the defendant. Id. at 315, 391 P.2d at 634-35. The complaint, however,
alleged that the defendant, through fraud and duress, later induced the plaintiff to sign a blank
power of attorney that would allow the defendant to transfer title to the truck into his name. Id., at
315, 391 P.2d at 635. The Oregon Supreme Court held that although the defendant converted the
truck by physically taking possession of it, the complaint sufficiently alleged, and the jury properly
found, that the defendant converted the truck by fraudulently inducing the power of attorney. Id. at
317, 391 P.2d at 635-36. The conversion occurred even though the defendant was already wrong-
fully in possession. Id. at 318-19, 391 P.2d at 636. Blakey and Cessar incorrectly assume that the
second conversion separately harmed the plaintiff; or in other words, that the plaintiff could recover
twice. This interpretation flies in the face of the accepted tort doctrine that "[t]he conversion is
complete when the defendant takes, detains or disposes of the chattel. At that point, it is the tradi-
tional view that the plaintiff acquires the right to enforce a sale, and recover the full value of the
property." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS, § 15, at 106 (5th ed. 1984). Blakey and Cessar confuse multiple theories supporting an
action for conversion with the singular harm flowing from the conversion. By analogy, if a thief
steals a car on Monday and then uses it on Tuesday, the thief has committed a single act of conver-
sion. The true owner has not suffered a separate injury caused by the thief's use, but merely has two
theories on which to pursue an action for conversion.
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RICO's legislative history bears this out. Upon introducing Senate Bill
2048, Senator Hruska stated the bill "would make the use of... income derived
from one line of business in another line of business a violation."' 17 1 Senate Bill
2048 sought to "prohibit the investment in legitimate business enterprises of in-
come derived from specified criminal activities."' 172 The synthesis of those bills,
Senate Bill 1623, had as its purpose "to prohibit the investment of... [certain]
... income" derived from racketeering.173 After hearings on various proposed
RICO statutes, the Department of Justice recognized the use or investment as
the essential nature of section 1962(a). 174 In the House, supporters of Senate
Bill 30 (the RICO statute enacted into law) also recognized that a section
1962(a) violation results from the investment of racketeering funds.17 5 Critics of
the investment use rule fail to cite any authority to support their contention that
Congress intended section 1962(a) to give relief to victims of the predicate
acts.17 6 Although the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that civil
RICO limits recovery to those damages resulting from competitive injuries,' 77
RICO's history reveals competitive injury was a prime motivating factor behind
the statute.178 The fact remains that competitors are not the only victims of the
use of racketeering proceeds.1 79 The mandate that courts must liberally con-
171. 113 CONG. Rzc. 17,999 (1967).
172. Id.
173. 115 CONG. Rnc. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
174. Senate Hearings, supra note 164, at 404-06. The Department of Justice reviewed § 1962(a)
and found the prohibition against investing racketeering income to be too broad because the pro-
posed language could be interpreted to prohibit the receipt of the proceeds. Id. at 405. To remedy
this defect it was suggested that only a "principal" could violate § 1962(a); in other words, a "person
who is an active participant in illegal enterprises." Id. at 406. Impliedly, if the statute requires an
active role for a violation, but does not prohibit the mere receipt of income, then the use or invest-
ment of the racketeering income is the violation. Congress later incorporated the Department of
Justice's "principal" suggestion into the statute ultimately enacted.
175. 116 CONG. Rnc. 35,196 (1970) (Representative Celler remarked that "[tihe title prohibits
the investment of funds derived from a pattern of racketeering.... ."). A House Judiciary subcom-
mittee received testimony from one Department of Justice assistant attorney general which confirms
that investing the racketeering income is the essence of a § 1962(a) violation. Organized Crime Con-
trol. Hearings on S. 30, and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 662-64 (1970). The Justice Department viewed § 1962(a) as "a whole
new offense.... Mhe offense is the investment of funds derived from enumerated racketeering-type
offenses. This provision goes to the infiltration of business by racketeers. Where you can prove that
the source of the racketeer's funds is illegal activity.., his investment is a Federal offense, punish-
able by a good many remedies you don't have under existing law." Id. at 663 (testimony of Assistant
Attorney General Will Wilson).
176. See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at 585 n.237.
177. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15 (1985).
178. "[T]he evil to be curbed is the unfair competitive advantage inherent in the large amount of
illicit income available to organized crime." 113 CONG. REc. 17,999 (1967) (remarks of Senator
Hruska). "[T]he bill also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who has been damaged
by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman." 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (remarks of
Senator Hruska).
179. If the racketeer's investments give him a monopoly on a market, purchasers who are forced
to buy at higher prices might be able to recover for the excess cost of doing business. Sedima, 473
U.S. at 521 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Also, "consumers are the victims of inferior products and
services, price-fixing and most of the other predatory practices of monopolies." 116 CONG. REC.
35,201 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff). The enterprise that is is acquired by the racketeering income
would also suffer harm caused by the investment of the racketeering funds. Blakey & Cessar, supra
note 86, at 586 n.237.
CIVIL RICO
strue RICO180 should not circumvent either the statute's plain language or the
congressional intent behind it.' 8 ' This conclusion is particularly appropriate
given the lack of debate on RICO's treble-damages provisions.' 8 2
The Fourth Circuit's policy argument-that the victim of a self-investing
corporate racketeer must necessarily rely on section 1962(a) for relief-adds
weight to the court's decision in favor of this particular plaintiff. But given the
court's blanket condemnation of the investment use rule, the Busby opinion
would be more compelling had the court made a greater effort to distinguish the
circumstances under which section 1962(a) violations cause harm. Busby in-
volved a self-investing corporate racketeer, but the court gave no indication that
its decision was applicable only in like circumstances. The language of section
1962(a) and case law interpreting the statute, however, establish that multiple
scenarios are possible and the courts in fact have addressed them.
The racketeering person can invest the funds in a unrelated enterprise. At
least one court has found the victim of the predicate acts does not have stand-
ing;18 3 presumably the enterprise's competitors or customers would have stand-
ing.184 If Busby were applied to this scenario, nearly any plaintiff who can show
a pattern of racketeering and an economic injury from a single predicate act
would have access to federal court and receive treble damages. The only limita-
tion would be the requirement of section 1962(a) that the defendant purchase
180. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492 n.10.
181. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1028 n.91 ("The statute alone is the law. The
statute is what is supposed to be clear and it is."); see also Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366,
374 (1956) ("[W]hen the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute.").
182. Justice Marshall noted that the House of Representatives added treble damages to Senate
Bill 30 after the Senate had already passed the measure. The House failed to debate seriously this
provision and the Senate passed the House version without a conference. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 507
(Marshall, J., dissenting). During the two days of debate in the House, one critic of Senate Bill 30
expressed concern over the speed with which the Bill was making its way through the House.
"iTihis bill is another episode in the continuing problem that we are confronted with here when
public hysteria inspires legislative passion, and frequently the results are difficult to overcome." 116
CONG. REc. 35,210 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Conyers). "[I]f Congress had intended to bring about
dramatic changes in the nature of commercial litigation, it would at least have paid more than
cursory attention to the civil RICO provision." Sedima, 473 U.S. at 507 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Another court describes the treble damages provision as "a late addition, spot-welded to an already
fully-structured criminal statute with defined goals .... P.M.F. Services, Inc. v. Grady, 681 F.
Supp. 549, 555 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Given this history, the fact that a common-sense reading of the
statute produces inconsistent results does not mean a court should resort to a "strained reading" of
the statute. Id. at 556. In light of the tenor of the times, a concern far more pressing than RICO's
treble damages was "the rash of bombings" targeted against police stations, courthouses, and college
campuses. 116 CONG. REc. 35,298 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Schadeberg). Numerous House mem-
bers expressed their outrage against the bombings and welcomed the addition of Title X1 to the
Organized Crime Control Act as a way to turn back "the senseless and terrifying wave of bomb-
ings." 116 CONG. RaE. 35,308 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Gerald Ford).
183. See Waldscbmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga. App. 707, 709, 340 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1986). The plain-
tiff purchased a laundromat from the defendant and later claimed the defendant fraudulently misled
him as to the amount of income produced by the laundromat. Id. at 707, 340 S.E.2d at 665.
Although the plaintiff claimed the defendant used the racketeering income to acquire or establish
defendant's insurance business, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing under
§ 1962(a) because he could not show injury resulting from the investment of the proceeds from the
sale of the laundromat. Id. at 709, 340 S.E.2d at 666.
184. See supra notes 178-79.
1991]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
more than one percent of a corporation's stock and have voting power 185
Where the racketeering person (an otherwise legitimate corporation) and
the enterprise are identical, and the corporation uses the racketeering income in
its own operations, three situations can occur. The racketeering person may use
the income to establish and operate a subdivision of itself and that subdivision
then harms the plaintiff. At least one court has agreed the plaintiff has standing
in such a case. 186 Another fact pattern involves the corporate racketeer using
racketeering income merely to meet its legitimate overhead costs. Some courts
consider the use of the money to be unrelated to the harm caused by the predi-
cate acts, and therefore deny the plaintiff standing.187 At least one court has
disagreed.188 One reason given for denying standing under these circumstances
is that "any time a RICO enterprise which was also the defendant invested the
proceeds of its first predicate act in its own operations, the commission of the
second predicate act would automatically fulfill the causation requirement."1 89
Arguably, using the ill-gotten gain frees up funds that the racketeering corpora-
tion would have needed to pay its overhead; the corporate racketeer is therefore
able to maintain its operations and is capable of committing the second predicate
act. The causal connection, however, still remains impermissibly tenuous since
the predicate acts, rather than the proceeds, harmed the plaintiff.190
A third scenario involving the self-investing corporate racketeer suggests
that the self-investment enables the plaintiff to perpetuate the pattern of racke-
teering and the plaintiff is subsequently harmed. Several courts agree the plain-
tiff has standing. 191 An ironic situation results if a court adopts this reasoning.
For the plaintiff to recover for harm suffered by a predicate act, the defendant
must commit a racketeering act against the plaintiff, then commit a second act
to form a pattern, and finally use the proceeds in the enterprise in such a way
that it perpetuates the racketeering scheme and harms the plaintiff. Courts em-
bracing the investment use rule have implicitly adopted this "double injury"
requirement, 192 while courts that disfavor the rule have explicitly repudiated
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text for a discussion
of § 1962(a)'s de minimis investment requirement.
186. Omega Constr. Co. v. Altman, 667 F. Supp. 453, 465 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
187. See, eg., Vista Co. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 725 F. Supp. 1286, 1299-1300 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Palumbo v. I.M. Simon & Co., 701 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (N.D. Iii. 1988); DeMuro v. E.F.
Hutton, 662 F. Supp. 308, 308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
188. See Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 658 F. Supp. 315, 321-22 (M.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 862 F.2d
310 (3d Cir.), aff'd sub. nom. In re Elwell, 862 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1988).
189. Vista Co., 725 F. Supp. at 1299-1300.
190. While self-investment for overhead costs could satisfy § 1962(a)'s language that the use of
racketeering income to operate an enterprise is a violation, § 1964(c) liability must still be predicated
on an injury suffered by reason of the violation. See Williamson v. Simon & Schuster, 735 F. Supp.
565, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). A court in an earlier case also cautioned against finding liability for the
self-investing corporate racketeer because the investment may have been used to further legitimate
corporate activities unconnected to the plaintiff's injuries. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659
F. Supp. 1249, 1256, opinion upon reconsideration, 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 838
F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988).
191. See, eg., Long Island Lighting Co. v. General Elec. Co., 712 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.N.Y.
1989); Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195, 198 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
192. See Blue Cross, 680 F. Supp. at 198; Omega Constr. Co. v. Altman, 667 F. Supp. 453, 465
(W.D. Mich. 1987).
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it.193 The irony is that third parties, such as competitors, may be injured by the
use of the racketeering proceeds, but still have standing to sue even absent a
showing of injury by any predicate act.194
One other scenario is possible: the person and enterprise are identical, but
they exist solely for the purpose of committing fraud, and the self-investment
funds the illegitimate operation. At least one court has found that the victim of
the predicate acts has standing. 195
The Busby court's failure to distinguish these various situations is its princi-
ple fault, resulting in a holding that, if not wrong, is too broad. While the court
did note in passing that a RICO plaintiff may suffer injuries caused by the opera-
tion of the enterprise, 196 it never analyzed section 1962(a) to determine the re-
quired extent of defendant's use of the racketeering income to operate the
enterprise. Must the funds perpetuate the racketeering and thereby further
harm the plaintiff, or must they merely contribute to the ordinary business ex-
penses of the corporate racketeer? Busby essentially adopts the latter position:
a plaintiff would have standing if, after the corporate racketeer completed the
final racketeering act, the corporation used the racketeering proceeds to pay its
electric bill. The former choice, as adopted in Blue Cross,197 is a more reason-
able interpretation of section 1962(a) and affords several advantages. This posi-
tion expands an overly restricted plaintiff class without violating the plain
language of section 1962(a). It also maintains section 1964(c)'s proximate cause
requirement which Busby discards. Because the Blue Cross position implicitly
rests on a double injury requirement, this interpretation might appear to be
nothing more than an attempt to resuscitate the long-dead "distinct racketeering
injury" requirement. 198 However, a "distinct racketeering injury" purportedly
was unique and differed from a mere predicate racketeering act. The Blue Cross
position grants standing where the self-investing corporate racketeer uses the
income to fund its operations and thereby perpetuates the racketeering activities;
those subsequent racketeering acts causally connected to the investment can
properly be considered the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Based on
the pattern of racketeering alleged in Busby, the Fourth Circuit could have
adopted the reasoning of Blue Cross to permit the plaintiff to maintain his ac-
tion, rather than completely eschew the investment use rule.
The fundamental question Busby failed to address is why the statute re-
193. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 1-. Supp. 781, 805-07
(E.D. La. 1986).
194. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text; see also Blakey & Cessar, supra note 86, at
586 n.237 ("Little doubt exists . . . that direct investment or competitive injury is within the
statute.").
195. See Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249, 1256, opinion upon reconsider-
ation, 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988). See supra note 112
for a discussion of Snider.
196. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837. The complaint did allege that Crown used the racketeering income
in its operations, and that Hammermill used its racketeering proceeds to establish and operate the
CDA Division. Id. at 840.
197. Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Pa. 1988). See supra note 110 for a discus-
sion of Blue Cross.
198. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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quires a subsequent investment or use of the funds. If a plaintiff is injured by the
predicate act, is his injury made any worse if the defendant later uses or invests
the money? Conversely, why should a plaintiff who is injured not recover for the
same harm solely because the racketeer (unlikely as this may be) did not use or
invest the money? 199 Or if the racketeer did invest the money, it was not to the
extent proscribed by the statute?20° The answer lies in the type of harm Con-
gress sought to remedy: monopolization of legitimate businesses that puts com-
petitors at a disadvantage, deprives customers and suppliers of the "free
channels of trade," and imperils free enterprise. 20 1 Although Congress certainly
wanted to curb the power of organized crime, it deliberately chose to keep the
class of plaintiffs limited; otherwise the statute would permit plaintiffs suffering
personal injuries caused by racketeering activities to seek RICO relief.20 2
Despite Busby's faults, strict application of the investment use rule also is
unsatisfactory. First, how would plaintiffs not injured by the predicate acts
learn of the pattern of racketeering? Most likely those plaintiffs would receive
notice only after the racketeering victim began legal action against the racketeer.
Second, tracing the proceeds to the plaintiff's injury would be difficult, especially
in the case of a corporation that receives legitimate as well as racketeering in-
come and uses both to maintain its operation. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits,
however, have found that section 1962(a)'s prohibition against indirect use offers
a solution.20 3 Finally, the rule can shield egregious corporate racketeers from
feeling the sting of a powerful remedy. 2°4
199. One commentator has noted that in a criminal RICO action, those who commit predicate
racketeering acts but do not actually engage in the act prohibited by the statute-under § 1962(a),
the investment or use of racketeering income--cannot be indicted as accomplices or coconspirators.
Lynch, supra note 48, at 702. If civil liability requires that violative act, then civil RICO plaintiffs
have no relief for injuries caused by those racketeers who do not use or invest the racketeering
proceeds as prohibited by the statute.
200. For a discussion of § 1962(a)'s.de minimis investment requirement, see supra notes 163-64
and accompanying text.
201. 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
202. See Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 19, 27 & n.43 (1987).
203. In United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980), the court affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction under § 1962(a). Id. at 628-29. The defendant in McNary was a former mayor
charged with using his power of office to extort money and receive bribes. Id. at 622. The defendant
allegedly invested the racketeering income in a travel agency. Id. The court agreed the prosecution
proved that the defendant violated § 1962(a) despite having combined the racketeering income with
other funds in a bank account. The receipt of the racketeering income placed in the account enabled
the defendant to make an equivalent investment in the travel agency without depleting the legitimate
assets in the bank account. Id. at 629. This "indirect" use of the racketeering income was sufficient
to convict the defendant. Id. Under the investment use rule, the racketeering-funded enterprise that
caused economic injury to competitors, customers, or suppliers would be civilly liable.
Shortly after Busby, the Fourth Circuit itself affirmed a § 1962(a) criminal conviction in United
States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1990). Citing McNary, the Fourth Circuit held that the
racketeering income does not have to be "directly traced in proof from its original illegal receipt to
its ultimately proscribed 'use or investment' by the defendant." Id. at 1194. The Vogt court found
that § 1962(a)'s expansive language "easily" supported a custom service officer's conviction for using
bribe money to invest in a North Carolina apartment complex and to purchase several luxury items,
Id. at 1187-89, 1194. The Vogt opinion casts serious doubt upon the Fourth Circuit's prior conten-
tion that tracing racketeering income is an insurmountable hurdle, see Busby, 896 F.2d at 839, espe-
cially when the burden of proof in a civil claim is less than in a criminal action.
204. The judicial desire to mete out stern punishment should not produce result-oriented dci-
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Read narrowly, the Fourth Circuit's decision to allow the plaintiff in Busby
to have his day in court appears defensible. The court's analysis is still trouble-
some, especially as it failed to reach a reasonable middle ground. The court
should have adopted Blue Cross's requirement of a double injury flowing from
investments that perpetuate racketeering activities. Read more broadly, Busby is
symptomatic of laudable congressional intentions gone awry, further exacer-
bated by inconsistent judicial approaches. One hopes the Supreme Court will
impose order on a helter-skelter statute. Given the schismatic results that fol-
lowed Sedima, it would be pure speculation to assume that another attempt to
clarify RICO would succeed.- The most effective solution, therefore, would be
for Congress to redraft an obviously flawed statute to carefully delimit the class
of RICO plaintiffs. 20 5
ScoTr A. MISKIMON
sions like Busby. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, not every racketeer is" 'liable for treble
damages to everyone he might have injured by other conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those
who have not been injured.'" Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985) (quoting
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1984), aff'd, 473
U.S. 606 (1985)).
205. The Supreme Court has expressly disavowed attempts to reform RICO, declaring that
"RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it is so inclined, and
not for this Court." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (1989).
1991]

